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Abstract
We present a model of voting behaviour based on a version of aggregated overdispersed
multinomial distributions; relative to a similar model by Brown and Payne (1986), our
model is based on more realistic assumptions and free from certain shortcomings of the
previous model. We show that, within this model, it is possible to test for certain con-
founding effects due to observable covariates measured at the aggregate level; such effects,
if ignored, might cause substantial bias in the estimated relation between voting decisions
in two close in time elections, a phenomenon known as Ecological Fallacy. An applica-
tion to a referendum following an election for the major in the town of Milan, which was
interpreted as a defeat for the Berlusconi gouvernment, is used as an illustration.
Keywords: Ecological inference, Voting behaviour, split-ticket voting
1 Introduction
In its simplest form, ecological inference aims to draw conclusions about the joint distribution
of a pair of variables measured on subjects belonging to a given population, from data aggre-
gated within geographic units, see for instance Greiner and Quinn (2009). These procedures
are also known as ecological regression in the simpler context where a linear regression model
is assumed to holds at the individual level as in Gelman et al (2001). The fact that the
strength and even the direction of the dependence at the aggregated level may be substan-
tially different from that at the individual level, a phenomenon known as Ecological Fallacy,
is well known since Robinson (1950). The conceptual advantages of deriving a model for the
aggregated data from a well specified model at the individual level has been emphasized by
Guthrie and Sheppard (2001), see also the additional references they provide. They describe
in details a collection of fictitious examples that illustrate the problems that can arise by
neglecting the effects of aggregation. The bayesian model of Wakefield (2004) for the case
of data in the form of a 2 × 2 table and that by Greiner and Quinn (2009) for the general
r× c case may be seen as well specified models at the level of individuals which, among other
things, help to clarify the sources of biasses that may be introduced by aggregation.
King (1997) and Glynn and Wakefield (2010), among others, have discussed application
of ecological inference to assess the effect of race on voting behaviour. The model by Brown
and Payne (1986), which we will discuss in more detail below, is also a model of voting
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behaviour specified at the level of individuals. Estimates of voting transitions between two
successive elections are relevant to political scientists who may want to know if, for instance,
the victory of a candidate was due to her/his ability to attract voters who abstained in
the previous election or to strategic vote by supporters of a minor candidate who wanted to
prevent the main opponent from wining (see for instance Alvarez et al., 2006). Estimation
of voting transitions is a natural field of application of ecological inference because the data
on the number of votes cast on each option recorded at the level of polling stations are freely
available in most European countries. On the other hand, survey data where voters are asked
what they did in the two last elections, in addition to being expensive to collect, are biased
because voters may not tell the truth or refuse to respond; in addition, non voters would be
difficult to include .
The approach to likelihood inference on voting transitions presented in this paper build on
the work of Forcina and Marchetti (2011) and is an attempt to improve the model of Brown and
Payne (1986) by assuming a different structure of over-dispersion which we believe provides
a more realistic model of voting behaviour and, in addition, removes a technical problem
related to the central limit approximation of the likelihood. In section 2 we describe the
nature of electoral data, recall Brown and Payne (1986) model, formulate our proposal and
discuss, briefly, likelihood based versus Bayesian inference in this context. In section 3 we
examine certain possible sources of ecological biases in the context of voting transitions that
can be embedded, and thus estimated, within our model; we also report the results of a small
simulation study documenting the performance of the estimation method in such contexts.
In section 4 we discuss an application to a recent election in the city of Milan, Italy.
2 Models of voting behaviour
To introduce the subject, it may be useful to review briefly the formulation of Goodman
(1953). Suppose that the region of interest is divided into k polling stations; let X, Y denote,
respectively, the choices made in two successive elections and
P (j; i, s) = pr(Y = j | X = i, S = s), j = 1, . . . c, i = 1, . . . , r, s = 1, . . . k
the probability that a voter in polling station s chooses option j in the latest election, having
chosen i in the previous one. Suppose we assume that
1. transition probabilities do not depend on the polling station, that is P (j; i, s) = P (j; i);
2. voters decide independently of one another.
Let ns = (n1s, . . . , nrs)
′ denote the vector containing the number of votes for each option
at the earlier election in polling station s and yis = (y1is, . . . , ycis)
′ the number of votes for
the options available at the latest election among voters in polling station s who had chosen
option i in the earlier election. If yis was observable, the above assumptions imply that
yis ∼Multinomial(nis,pi),
where pi = (P (1; i), . . . , P (c; i))
′. These data could be arranged in a two way contingency
table within each polling station with the voting options of the earlier and latest election
arranged by row and column respectively; however, only the row and column marginals ns
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and ys =
∑
i yis are available. By taking expectations within each multinomial, it follows that
E (ys | p1, . . . ,pr) =
∑
i nispi, hence the transition probability may be estimated by linear
regression. To do so, we need to remove the last entry from each ys to account for the fixed
row totals and stack the resulting vector of frequencies one below the other. This provides
k(c− 1), observations to estimate the r(c− 1) parameters; thus the model is identified when
r ≤ k.
Though linear regression provides unbiased estimates of transition probabilities under the
assumption of multinomial distribution, these are inefficient because the covariance structure
is ignored; in addition, estimated transition probabilities may not lay between 0 and 1, in
which case adjustments are required.
2.1 The aggregated compound multinomial model
The contribution of Brown and Payne (1986) may be seen as a substantial improvement both
in the formulation and in the method of estimation relative to the previous model. They start
by assuming that the behaviour of individuals, like in the Bayesian models to be discussed
below, is determined by vectors of transition probabilities pis which are specific to each polling
station; however, to make the model identified, they assume that variability across polling
stations which is not accounted by covariates is random, more precisely
pis ∼ Dirichlet(pii, θi),
where E (pis) = pii and Var (pis) = θi[diag(pii)−piipi
′
i]. This random effect model is equivalent
to assume that the behaviour of the nis voters living within the boundaries of the same polling
station, who made the same choice in the previous election, are correlated, probably because
they share similar local features which are, usually, unobserved.
Brown and Payne also worked out the full likelihood; parameterized with the logits of the
expected transition probabilities and those of over-dispersion
λij = log
piij
piic
, τi = log
θi
1− θi
, i = 1, . . . , r, j = 1, . . . , c− 1.
Because the likelihood involves the sum of a product of multinomials and is very hard to com-
pute, unless the row totals in ns are very small, they suggested a central limit approximation.
Maximum likelihood estimates are computed by maximizing the approximate likelihood with
respect to the parameters which, in the simplest case of no covariates, are λij and τi param-
eters and the transition probabilities are obtained by the reconstruction formulas
pˆiij =
exp(λˆij)
1 +
∑c−1
1
exp(λˆij)
, pˆiic = 1−
c−1∑
1
pˆiij.
The logit link used in the model insures that the estimated transition probabilities are strictly
positive and sum to 1. In addition, it provides a natural framework for modelling the effect of
covaruates measured at the level of polling stations; this is discussed in detail below. Forcina
and Marchetti (1989) proposed some minor extension of the model and gave more details on
computation of the score vector and information matrix.
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2.2 The new model
One problem with the above model is that the compound multinomial, that is the distribution
obtained by integrating out the pis, has a variance function of the form
Var (yis | θi,pii) = nis[1 + θi(nis − 1)][diag(pii)− piipi
′
i]
which is quadratic in the sample size. Intuitively, under the assumed model each yis is affected
by a single draw from a Dirichelet, irrespective of the sample size; because of this the central
limit approximation is likely to be inaccurate. On a more substantive ground, it seems more
realistic to assume that voters interact with each other within smaller circles whose size can
vary at random and should not increase with the sample size. With this in mind, Forcina and
Marchetti (2011) propose the following assumptions for modelling over-dispersion:
• voting behaviour in the latest election of voters of party i in the earlier election who
live in local unit s is homogenous within small clusters and is determined by a vector
of transition probabilities which is specific to cluster h within polling station s, these
probabilities are denoted pish and we assume that
pish ∼ Dirichlet(pii, θi);
• the sizes of the clusters, within which voters of party i in polling station s split, follows a
Multinomial(nis,1(Cis/nis)), where Cis is the average cluster size; note that this implies
that clusters are, on average, of the same size.
In the Appendix we show that, under these assumptions
Var (yis | θi,pii, Cis) = nis
[
1 + θiCis
nis − 1
nis
]
[diag(pii)− piipi
′
i]. (1)
This expression is linear in the sample sizes nis for fixed Cis, the average cluster size which
should be reasonably small. Because Cis and θi are not identifiable simultaneously, we propose
to assume that Cis = C is constant and known and then to perform a sensitivity analysis to
assess the effect of different choices for C. Our sensitivity analysis indicates that changing
the value of C has no detectable effect on the estimates of transition probabilities and only a
minor effect on the estimate of θi.
Under the normal approximation, the likelihood depends on the parameters that determine
the transition probabilities piij on the logit scale and on the over-dispersion parameters θi
which is also parameterized on the logit scale. The log-likelihood can be maximized by a Fisher
scoring algorithm, this requires computing the score vector and the expected information
matrix. At convergence, the information matrix may be used to compute asymptotic standard
errors by a first order approximation. Because these calculations are rather tedious and the
tools required are essentially the same outlined by Brown and Payne (1986), they will be
made available as supplementary material.
2.3 Bayesian versus Likelihood inference
The point of view taken in this paper is that Bayesian or likelihood based inferences should be
assessed on their own grounds and may be both valid. The likelihood assumed in the Bayesian
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models proposed by Wakefield (2004) for the 2 × 2 case and by Greiner and Quinn (2009)
for the general r × c case is identical to the ones assumed here and in the Brown and Payne
model. However, the quantities of interest are usually different: in the Bayesian approach one
obtains the posterior distribution of the cell frequencies in each local units conditionally on the
observed margins. Instead, likelihood inference aims at estimating the transition probabilities
pii, i = 1, . . . r for the whole area, in additiona to regression coefficients if covariates are
available. An obvious property of the Bayesian estimates of cell frequencies is that they
are always consistent with the rows and columns totals, a property whose importance has,
perhaps, been overemphasized in the work of G. King, see for instance King (1997). Estimates
of transition probabilities at the level of local units or for the whole population may then be
easily computed if of interest.
An advantage of the likelihood approach is that its results are not dependent on the
choice of an appropriate hierarchical prior. Greiner and Quinn (2009), among others, have
investigated the sensitivity of the results to the prior specifications. From a non-Bayesian
point of view, the estimated transition probabilities need not be exactly consistent with the
marginal frequencies: the objective of inference is to estimate the parameters that determine
the assumed generating mechanism, not the actual number of transitions. On the other hand,
the problem of estimating cell frequencies conditionally to the observed marginals and the
estimated parameters, can be framed as the problem of computing the expected value of a
multivariate extended hypergeometric distribution, see Bartolucci et al (2001), section 3.3. An
early attempt to solve this problem is due to Firth (1982) who was trying to implement an EM
algorithm for ecological inference. Though there is no closed form expression for computing
this expectation, good approximations may be provided by the iterative proportional fitting
algorithm or by a normal approximation of the extended hypergeometric.
3 Ecological bias and the effect of covariates
The nature of the ecological fallacy and its relation with the Simpson’s paradox is clearly
explained by Wakefield (2004), section 3.3, in the context of dichotomous variables. A general
discussion may be based on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) with a causal interpretation;
within this framework, the direct effect ofX on Y is determined by the transition probabilities.
In Fig. 1 below, the dependence of Y on X can be recovered without bias from aggregated
data only in the causal model on the left, where Y ⊥S | X like in the basic Goodman model.
The result follows from the fact that the conditional probabilities P (Y = j | X = i) are the
unknowns in the system of linear equations that can be be derived from the DAG
P (Y = j | S = s) =
∑
i
P (Y = j | X = i)P (X = i | S = s);
this system has a unique solution if the equations are consistent and, like for the Goodman
model, r ≤ k. The other two graphs to the right characterize contexts where ecological fallacy
is possible, essentially because X and Y have a common ”cause” inducing confounding. When
this happens, data on the joint distribution of X, Y and the confounder is necessary to obtain
an unbiased estimate of the effect of X on Y ; this follows, for instance, by applying the do
operator in Pearl (1995). The second DAG of Figure 1 assumes that the nature of the local
units affects voting decisions in both elections; this may happen, for instance, when there are
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Figure 1: Three types of causal DAGs, only the first on the left cannot lead to ecological
fallacy.
areas with a strong tradition of right (or left) wing affiliation: it is likely that those who voted
a given party in the previous election may behave differently depending on whether or not
they live in areas where that party has a strong local roots. This context is similar the one
described by Guthrie and Sheppard (2001) where X denotes the event of being protestant
and Y that of committing suicide: a simple ecological regression indicated positive association
leading to the conclusion that suicide was more common among protestants. A more detailed
analysis revealed that living in an area with a protestant majority caused distress among
catholic residents leading to a greater number of suicides among catholics. In the last DAG
on the right, local features affect a variable V which has an influence on the results in the
last elections. For instance, V might be the party voted at an even earlier election or the age
group of the voter.
A special case of the second DAG above is when the proportion of voters with a given
value of X may be used as a covariate to control for confounding. Chambers and Steel (2001)
explain why, within a linear regression model like Goodman’s, this additional effect would
not be identifiable. Our model, as well as Brown and Payne’s logistic model, is free from
this problem because the dependence of the transition probabilities on X is not linear on the
logistic scale. The model depicted in the third DAG is more problematic because to model
the distribution of Y | X,V , observations on the marginal distributions of (S,X, V ) and S, Y
would be required. A model where we use the proportion of voters for a given options of
V as a covariate might help removing bias only in very special circumstances. Suppose, for
instance, that V is the choice made in a previous election of a different kind; it might be that
the local units with a larger proportion of voters for party V = v in that election are those
where the party has a larger number of militants and stronger roots, a feature which might
affect the behaviour of local voters. However, this model is structurally different from a model
where we assume that, for instance, those who voted party v in two previous elections are
more likely to vote it again relative to those who voted it only in the previous election. To
estimate such a model by ecological inference, data on the joint distribution of V, X in each
polling station wold be required.
Whenever confounding may be controlled, at least approximately, bythe introduction of
appropriate covariates as described above, these may be inserted in the logistic link function;
for instance, for a single covariate V , let
log(pisij/pisic) = αij + βijvs, (2)
where αij denotes the baseline logit and vs is a known function of the frequency distribution
of V in polling station s. Note that, when inserting a single covariate into a model of vote
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transitions, unless some restriction on the βij is imposed, r(c− 1) additional parameters are
required. More parsimonious models involving covariates may be constructed by assuming,
as we do in the application, that a given covariate affects only a given cell so that all the βij
are 0 except one.
3.1 A simulation study
The model described in Section 2 may be seen as a data generating mechanism that can
be implemented to produce electoral data from a given probability distribution. We first
use this device to show how a specified amount of confounding may distort the linearity
of regression predicted in the Goodman model and then to assess the performance of our
estimation algorithm when the effect of confounding can be modelled by the inclusion of
covariates. Generation of artificial electoral data are based on the following steps:
• use a uniform within preassigned bounds to sample the number of voters and the prob-
abilities of voting for the available parties in the first election in each polling station
and then a multinomial to obtain the actual number of votes in the latest election;
• for s = 1, . . . k and i = 1, . . . , r, the number of clusters is set equal to the integer part of
nis/C, where C is the average cluster size, the sizes of these clusters are sampled from
a multinomial with uniform probabilities;
• the actual transition probabilities within each cluster are sampled from a Dirichelet
whose expected values may depend on covariates; these probabilities are used to sample
the actual number of votes for the options available in the second election within each
cluster; the final results in the second election are obtained by summing across clusters
and parties.
For simplicity, we assumed that only two options were available in both elections. In (2)
let α11 = log(.7/.3), α21 = log(.2/.8) and vs = xs−
∑
s vs/k, where xs = log(ns1/ns2), that is,
the only available covariate is the centered logits of the results in the first election. Consider
three alternative models: (i) no confounding, that is β11 = β21 = 0, (ii) concordant effects
with β11 = 1, β21 = 0.5, (iii) discordant effects with β11 = −1, β21 = 0.5. Data for 200
polling stations having between 600 and 800 voters were generated with θ1 = θ2 = 0.1; the
proportion of votes for party 1 in both elections are plotted in Fig. 2. The results of an
ecological regression which neglected confounding would fit a regression line to the observed
points: in (i) the observed points follow the true regression line; under (ii) the observed
regression line is much steeper, leading to over estimate the association between X and Y ;
under (iii) the observed relation is non linear and the overall association appears slightly
negative, leading to a substantial underestimation of the true association.
Under the discordant model and the settings described above, 1000 samples were gener-
ated and, for each sample, the maximum likelihood estimates under the correct model were
computed. To see how the properties of the estimates changed with the sample size, estimates
were computed also for the case where the number of voters per polling stations were between
2400 and 3200. Estimates of the bias on each parameter are given in Table 1 below: they
are small and seem to decrease with sample size. Only for the overdispersion parameter, the
bias is a little more substantial. Ratios between the average standard errors of the estimates
computed from the information matrix and those estimated from the sample variances are
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Figure 2: Simulated proportions of voters for party 1 in the first (X) and the second (Y)
election for no confounding, concordant and discordant effects; dashed line is the expected
relation under no confounding.
given in the same table: the fact that the ratios are smaller than 1 indicates that standard
errors computed from the information matrix underestimate slightly sample variability and
the effect decreases with the sample size. Again the performance is worst relative to τ . The
Table 1: Sample bias and ratios of standard errors based on information matrix and sample
variances
Sample size α11 α21 τ β11 β21
600-800 Bias -0.0202 0.0312 -0.1006 0.0054 0.0118
2400-3200 Bias -0.0038 0.0069 -0.0744 0.0011 0.0028
600-800 Ratios of s.e. 0.9654 0.9616 0.9140 0.9656 0.9641
2400-3200 Ratios of s.e. 0.9943 0.9985 0.9330 0.9939 0.9906
proportion of sample estimates with an absolute error that exceeds given thresholds taken
from the normal distribution are displayed in Table 2: when the sample size is smaller the
distribution of the sample estimates for most parameters appear to have heavier tails relative
to the normal.
4 An application
In May 15th 2011 in the city of Milan there was an election for the mayor and party represen-
tatives in the city council followed on the 29th by a run-off ballot between the previous mayor
Mrs Moratti supported by the Mr Berlusconi’s gouverning coalition and Mr Pisapia supported
by most parties from the left. A national referendum promoted by the opposition party Italia
dei Valori (IdV) was held on June 12th to cancel several laws passed by the gouvernment.
One of these laws allowed the Prime Minister, who is under trial under several accusations, to
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claim that the duties of his office prevented him from attending the Courts, thus postponing
a decision at his will. In this application we study the behaviour of voters at the Referendum
on this particular issue relative to their behaviour at the run-off ballot: Berlusconi and his
supporters had campaigned for not going to vote at the referendum because, if less than 50%
went to vote, the result of the referendum would be irrelevant. Lega Nord (LN), which belongs
to the gouverning coalition, was much less motivated in supporting Berlusconi on this specific
issue relative to voters of Partito delle Liberta’ (PdL), Berlusconi’s own party. It is likely that
some of the supporters of the center opposition party Unione di Centro (UdC), who abstained
at the run-off feeling that Pisapia was much to the left, decided to vote with the left parties
at the referendum.
The municipality of Milan has about 990 thousands voters; after excluding the few atypical
polling stations like hospitals, we could use data from 1159 polling stations. As covariates we
used the centered logits of the proportion of votes cast on May 15the for the following options:
(i) Pdl, (ii) (LN), (iii) UdC, (iv) (IdV), (v) abstain and blank ballots (NoV). The estimated
transition matrix with standard errors, averaged across polling stations, are given on the left-
hand side of Table 3 and the estimated effects of covariates are on the right-hand side of the
same table. As expected, a large proportion of those who supported Pisapia voted ”yes” at
the Referendum which was also supported by almost 30% of voters who had abstained at the
run-off. Even more interesting is that over 22% of those who had supported Moratti did not
follow Berlusconi’s recommendations and went to vote at the Referendum, Estimates of the
regression parameters, which are all highly significant is briefly discussed below. Note that,
whenever we assume that a covariate affects the residual category of NoV, the actual sign
of the regression parameter which is estimated from the induced effect on the other voting
options, is reversed.
• the proportion of those who voted ”yes” at the Referendum, having supported Moratti
at the Ballot, increases in polling stations with a larger proportion of voters for LN; this
indicates that these voters were reluctant to follow Berlusconi on this issue;
• the proportion of those who abstained at the Referendum, having supported Moratti at
the Ballot, increased in polling stations with a larger proportion of voters for PdL; this
indicates that PdL supporters tended to obey the recommendation of their party;
• the proportion of those who voted ”yes” at the Referendum, having abstained at the
Ballot, increased in polling stations with a larger proportion of voters for UdC as ex-
pected;
Table 2: Proportion of sample estimates whose absolute error exceeds zσˆ
z 1.2815 1.6449 1.9600 2.576 1.2815 1.6449 1.9600 2.576
α11 0.1660 0.0960 0.0500 0.0200 0.1960 0.0920 0.0470 0.0140
α21 0.1780 0.1040 0.0510 0.0150 0.2010 0.0910 0.0490 0.0120
τ 0.1890 0.1090 0.0540 0.0140 0.1860 0.1020 0.0570 0.0160
β11 0.1800 0.0850 0.0540 0.0190 0.1880 0.0920 0.0450 0.0100
α21 0.1950 0.1070 0.0560 0.0140 0.1950 0.0980 0.0490 0.0160
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Table 3: Average estimated transitions from Ballot to Referendum and covariates effects
Transition Probabilities Regression estimates
Yes No NoV Covariate βˆ s.e.(β)
Moratti 0.1388 0.0858 0.7754 LN on Yes | Moratti 0,3311 0,1061
s.s. 0.0208 0.0068 0.0219 UdC on Yes| Pisapia 0.0810 0,0282
Pisapia 0.9380 0.0000 0.0620 NoV on Yes-No | NoV -0.7326 0,0692
s.e. 0.0140 0.0000 0.0140 PdL on Yes-No | Moratti -0.3996 0,0637
NoV 0.2938 0.0428 0.6633 IdV on Yes-No | Pisapia 0.4167 0.078
s.e. 0.0211 0.0061 0.0223
• the proportion of those who abstained at the Referendum, having abstained at the
Ballot, increased in polling stations with a larger proportion of abstainers; this indicates
that there is a structural proportion of voters who abstain most of the time;
• the proportion of those who abstained at the Referendum, having supported Pisapia at
the Ballot, decreased in polling stations with a larger proportion of voters for IdV; this
is consistent with the fact that these voters were the most militant on the issue.
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